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ABSTRACT
Context: The Heartbleed vulnerability brought OpenSSL to interna-
tional attention in 2014. The almost moribund project was a key
security component in public web servers and over a billion mobile
devices. This vulnerability led to new investments in OpenSSL.
Objective: The goal of this study is to determine how the Heart-
bleed vulnerability changed the software evolution of OpenSSL. We
study changes in vulnerabilities, code quality, project activity, and
software engineering practices.
Method: We use a mixed methods approach, collecting multiple
types of quantitative data and qualitative data from web sites and
an interview with a developer who worked on post-Heartbleed
changes. We use regression discontinuity analysis to determine
changes in levels and slopes of code and project activity metrics
resulting from Heartbleed.
Results: The OpenSSL project made tremendous improvements
to code quality and security after Heartbleed. By the end of 2016,
the number of commits per month had tripled, 91 vulnerabilities
were found and fixed, code complexity decreased significantly, and
OpenSSL obtained a CII best practices badge, certifying its use of
good open source development practices.
Conclusions: The OpenSSL project provides a model of how an
open source project can adapt and improve after a security event.
The evolution of OpenSSL shows that the number of known vulner-
abilities is not a useful indicator of project security. A small number
of vulnerabilities may simply indicate that a project does not ex-
pend much effort to finding vulnerabilities. This study suggests
that project activity and CII badge best practices may be better
indicators of code quality and security than vulnerability counts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Software libraries and repos-
itories; Software development techniques; Software evolu-
tion;Maintaining software.
KEYWORDS
software evolution, software security, case study
1 INTRODUCTION
The OpenSSL project came to the attention of the world with the
Heartbleed vulnerability on April 7, 2014. The open source crypto-
graphic library was widely used to secure communications using
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. An estimated 24-55%
of popular web sites using TLS were exposed to Heartbleed at-
tacks [6], which allowed attackers to remotely access private keys
and passwords. The number of client devices impacted was much
larger, as OpenSSL was the default cryptographic library for An-
droid devices, and more than one billion Android devices shipped
in 2014 [34].
At the time of Heartbleed, the OpenSSL project was largely
inactive, except for an ever-growing number of unaddressed issues.
The project had no full time developers, and the OpenSSL Software
Foundation received about $2,000 per year in donations [21]. There
were no policies for handling issues or vulnerabilities. OpenSSL
had no release plan, and the project was still supporting version
0.9.8, which had been released in 2005. Project source code was
complex and difficult to understand and maintain, while the project
team was small with static membership [13].
The goal of this case study is to understand how the OpenSSL
project responded to the Heartbleed vulnerability. We build this
understanding with a mixed methods approach. We collect quali-
tative data from web sites and a developer interview, and we use
quantitative data in the form of software metrics, including both
project activity and code metrics. Our choice of metrics was guided
in part by Lehman’s laws of software evolution [19]. In particular,
we analyze the first (continuing change) law using project activity
metrics, the second law (increasing complexity), using code com-
plexity metrics, and the sixth law (continuing growth) using code
size metrics. We use regression discontinuity analysis to determine
changes in levels and slopes of software metrics resulting from
Heartbleed.
We believe this is the first study of the impact of a major security
incident on software evolution. Our primary contribution is an
understanding of how a project can recover from a major security
incident. We learn that the number of reported vulnerabilities is a
poor indicator of security. Project activity and software engineering
practices required by the CII best practices badge 1 may be better
indicators of project security. Finally, we provide a replication pack-
age that includes both the data used in this paper and the code used
to collect and analyze the data [48]. Code to build the tables and
figures in this paper is also included.
2 CONTEXT
The first version of OpenSSL was released on December 23, 1998.
It was based on a fork of the SSLeay project. The project name
comes from the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, which has
been deprecated in favor of Transport Layer Security. OpenSSL
consists of two libraries, which provide support for TLS and gen-
eral cryptographic algorithms respectively, and a command line
tool, openssl, which can be used for encryption, decryption, and
certificate generation.
1https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
14
24
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
8 M
ay
 20
20
Table 1: OpenSSL Versions
Version Release Date Last Release Last Release Date Release Count Lifespan End of Life Code Size Vulnerabilities
0.9.1 1998-12-21 0.9.1c 1998-12-23 1 2 days 39,049
0.9.2 1999-03-22 0.9.2b 1999-04-06 1 15 days 40,112
0.9.3 1999-05-25 0.9.3a 1999-05-27 2 2 days 41,222
0.9.4 1999-08-09 0.9.4 1999-08-09 1 0 days 41,973
0.9.5 2000-02-28 0.9.5a 2000-04-01 2 33 days 44,594
0.9.6 2000-09-24 0.9.6m 2004-03-17 14 1270 days 47,025 10
0.9.7 2002-12-31 0.9.7m 2007-02-23 14 1515 days 60,442 9
0.9.8 2005-07-05 0.9.8zh 2015-12-03 35 3803 days 73,837 103
1.0.0 2010-03-29 1.0.0t 2015-12-03 21 2075 days 91,765 92
1.0.1 2012-03-14 1.0.1u 2016-09-22 22 1653 days 2016-12-31 100,415 127
1.0.2 2015-01-22 1.0.2u 2019-12-20 22 1793 days 2019-12-31 107,862 94
1.1.0 2016-08-25 1.1.0l 2019-09-10 13 1111 days 2019-09-11 100,957 30
1.1.1 2018-09-11 1.1.1d 2019-09-10 5 364 days 2023-09-11 116,486 8
Table 1 summarizes the major versions of OpenSSL, including
lifespan, minor releases, code size (number of statements), and
number of vulnerabilities reported per release. The version number
format is three digits followed by an optional letter, indicating
minor releases. Prior to Heartbleed, OpenSSL had no release policy.
Therefore, earlier versions have no end of life date. Lifespan is the
period between the first and last release of a numerical version.
Vulnerability reporting started in 2002, so earlier versions have
no vulnerabilities associated with them. Vulnerabilities often affect
multiple versions of OpenSSL, so the total number of vulnerabilities
is smaller than the sum of the vulnerabilities in the table.
Heartbleed focused intense scrutiny onOpenSSL. Two approaches
to OpenSSL were advocated: replacement or repair. Two forks were
created shortly after Heartbleed as potential replacements. Google’s
fork, BoringSSL [18], focused on supporting Android and Chrome.
The OpenBSD project’s fork was called LibreSSL [2] and focused
on improving security and code quality.
The repair approach was supported by the Core Infrastructure
Initiative (CII), which was started by the Linux Foundation as a
response to Heartbleed. The purpose of the CII was to fund and
support open-source projects that are critical to the functioning of
the Internet [7]. OpenSSL was among the first projects funded. CII
funded two full-time developers and a code audit. An additional
two developers were funded by donations [13]. CII supported the
project’s first face-to-facemeeting in late 2014, duringwhich project
members drafted major policies, including a release strategy, coding
style guide, and security policy.
3 RELATEDWORK
Lehman’s laws [19] provide a framework for understanding soft-
ware evolution that has been widely studied. Previous studies have
operationalized these laws terms of software metrics in multiple
ways [10, 20, 29]. We examine the first, second, and sixth laws in
this work. Multiple studies using a variety of metrics have found
that these three laws hold for most but not all open source projects
studied [9, 14, 29, 31, 52].
To study Lehman’s second law, we use code complexity metrics.
McCabe developed his cyclomatic complexity metric as a quantita-
tive measure of which software modules are difficult to maintain
or test [23]. Halstead developed complexity metrics for similar
purposes [12]. Midha et al. [26] found that the number of bugs in
software increased with increasing cyclomatic complexity, while
Gill and Kemerer [8] found that complexity density (the ratio of
cyclomatic complexity to lines of code) was a useful predictor of
maintenance productivity. Halstead’s and McCabe’s complexity
metrics have been used as predictors in defect prediction [24, 25]
and vulnerability prediction [37] models.
We use code size metrics to study Lehman’s sixth law. Code size
metrics have been used inmultiple studies of Lehman’s laws [10, 20].
Jimenez et al. describe characteristics of vulnerable files in OpenSSL
using code size and code complexity metrics [16], but do not use
them to study software evolution. We compute both code size and
code complexity metrics using the cqmetrics tool that Spinellis
used to study the evolution of the Unix operating system [41].
In addition to code size and complexity, we examine code style
and language feature use. Following a consistent coding style may
be an important aspect of readability and maintainability of soft-
ware [30, 38]. Programming languages like Java [30] and Python [47]
have style guides, while organizations like Google [11] publish style
guides for a variety of languages. Smit et al. [38] found that in the
absence of automated style checkers, the number of style violations
grows in a linear relationship with code size.
While the idea that use of goto is harmful [5] has been widely
heard by programmers, an empirical study of GitHub projects sug-
gested that use of goto for specific purposes like error handling
was considered good practice by open source developers [28]. On
the other hand, use of C preprocessor conditionals for portability
across different architectures has continued to receive blame for
making code difficult to read and maintain [27, 40].
While there are many studies of open source evolution, few
studies examine the impact of an external change on software
evolution. We use a regression discontinuity design [15, 33] (RDD)
to assess the impact of Heartbleed on the evolution of OpenSSL. This
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methodology has recently begun to be used in empirical software
engineering analyses of time series data. Zhao et al. used RDD to
evaluate the impact of adopting continuous integration on other
software development practices [53], while Trockman et al. used
RDD to test whether repository badges were reliable signals of
software quality [46]. Zimmermann and Artís evaluated the impact
of switching bug trackers on a single project with a RDDmodel [54].
Durumeric et al. measured the reaction to Heartbleed, finding
that Alexa Top 100 sites patched within 48 hours, while less popular
sites took longer to deploy patches [6]. Kupsch and Miller discuss
the difficulty software security tools have in finding vulnerabili-
ties like Heartbleed [17]. Wheeler describes software engineering
practices and technologies that could find vulnerabilities like Heart-
bleed, including simplifying the code, fuzzing with address check-
ing, and thorough security-focused testing [50]. We will examine
how OpenSSL adopted some of those approaches below.
4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We begin our study by examining the security of OpenSSL. We ex-
amine the number and severity of vulnerability reports over time to
understand how the Heartbleed vulnerability affected vulnerability
reporting. Our first research question is:
Research Question 1: How did the number and severity
of reported vulnerabilities change after Heartbleed?
We expect to see an increased number of vulnerability reports
after Heartbleed, as more effort was devoted to finding security
issues. Such an increase is an indicator of improving project security
as vulnerabilities are found and remediated.
OpenSSL has been under development for over two decades,
a substantial span of time in which open source development
has greatly changed. Lehman’s sixth law of software evolution
states that software continually grows in functionality to maintain
user satisfaction [19]. Adding new functionality typically requires
adding more code to a project. Therefore, we assess the size of
OpenSSL to see if this law holds after a major security incident. It
is worth noting that both of the post-Heartbleed forks of OpenSSL
began development by removing older cryptographic algorithms
and support for a variety of computing environments [2, 18]. Our
second research question is:
Research Question 2: How did OpenSSL change in size
after Heartbleed?
The quality of OpenSSL code before Heartbleed was perceived
as poor [2]. It was difficult to read and maintain, discouraging new
contributors from working on the project [13]. Therefore, we want
to measure code quality using metrics that impact the readability
and maintainability of code, such as code complexity metrics.
Lehman’s second law of software evolution states that program
complexity increases over time unless work is done to prevent
that [19]. With two decades of history, there has been ample time
for OpenSSL’s code to increase in complexity. While some com-
plexity is necessary for cryptographic code, unnecessary complex-
ity can accumulate over time. The complexity of OpenSSL code
was implicated as one of the causes of the Debian project acciden-
tally breaking the OpenSSL pseudo-random number generator in
2006 [4].
Research Question 3:How did the complexity of OpenSSL
source code change after Heartbleed?
As code style and the use of certain programming language
features can affect the readability and maintainability of software,
we also study these characteristics of the OpenSSL code base. We
examine the consistency of stylistic choices like bracket placement
and indentation, and we study the use of certain language features
in our study of coding style, such as the C preprocessor and the
goto statement.
Research Question 4: How did the coding style of
OpenSSL source code change after Heartbleed?
Lehman’s first law focuses on continuing change of a software
project. One of the major problems with OpenSSL at the time of
Heartbleed was insufficient developer activity to address technical
debt. The project team was also small and included no full time
developers, while team membership was static [13]. The number
of contributions from outside developers was small. There were no
guidelines for contributing to the project, while the source code
was difficult to understand and maintain, discouraging new con-
tributors.
The time for the developers to respond to issues was high, and
most issues were not addressed. The number of open, unaddressed
issues had grown steadily, reaching almost 1500 at the time of
Heartbleed [36].
To measure the change in project activity, we count the number
of commits before and after Heartbleed and measure the number
of commits per month. We also want to determine whether the
OpenSSL project was able to grow its development team and ac-
cept a substantial number of outside contributions in the wake of
Heartbleed, so we measure the number of authors.
Research Question 5: How did the number of commits
and the number of authors change after Heartbleed?
We also study the software engineering practices that led to
changes in project activity, code quality, and security. As the only
requirements and design documents available for OpenSSL are for
the forthcoming 3.0.0 release, we focus on implementation and
testing activities that have been identified as best practices by the
CII Best Practices Badge project [49].
Research Question 6: How did software engineering prac-
tices change after Heartbleed?
Finally, we want to determine if the changes in OpenSSL were
sustained well after the discovery of the Heartbleed vulnerability.
To address this question, we will not only examine trends in our
code and activity metrics through the end of 2019 but we will also
examine external assessments of the OpenSSL project.
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Research Question 7: Are the changes in OpenSSL’s secu-
rity, source code, and software engineering practices sus-
tained five years after Heartbleed?
5 DATA
We collected data on the OpenSSL project from a variety of sources,
including the project web site, vulnerabilities list, and GitHub repos-
itory. We also interviewed one OpenSSL developer.
Vulnerabilities:Vulnerability datawas collected from theOpenSSL
vulnerabilities list 2. We count vulnerabilities using unique Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers.
Code Metrics: The source code of OpenSSL was obtained from the
project’s GitHub repository 3. We used the cqmetrics package 4 to
compute code metrics, including size, complexity, language feature
use, and style metrics. This open source tool was chosen in part
because of its prior use in computing metrics on many versions
of Unix released over several decades [41]. For our monthly time
series data, we compute code metrics on the first commit made
during a month.
Project Activity: Metrics on project activity, such as the number
of authors and commits were obtained from the project’s GitHub
repository using PyDriller [39]. We compute authors per month
as the number of unique author names in commits made during a
month.
Software Engineering Practices: We reviewed the OpenSSL web
site, mailing lists, and GitHub repository for information on changes
in software engineering practices. We collected data on unit testing
from the project GitHub repository and from test coverage data
reported via coveralls.io.
Interviews: Our interview requests received a single response
from an OpenSSL team member who worked on the project im-
mediately after Heartbleed. We interviewed Rich Salz of Akamai,
who joined the project a couple of months after Heartbleed. He
helped change software engineering processes, including moving
to a GitHub pull request work flow, transitioning issue tracking to
GitHub, and adopting continuous integration.
6 METHODS
Weuse data visualization and statistical modeling to discover changes
in code metrics and project activity. In particular, we use a regres-
sion discontinuity design [15, 33] approach to analyze time series
of code and project activity metrics. RDD allows us to determine
whether changes in metrics occurred and to measure the effect size
of those changes.
Regression discontinuity design is a rigorous quasi-experimental
approach for analyzing the casual effect of an intervention. It is
based on the idea that in the absence of the intervention, the ob-
served trend before the intervention would continue afterwards. In
such a design, observations are assigned to an intervention condi-
tion based on a cutoff score. In time series analysis, the cutoff is a
date. The cutoff date can be determined by visually inspecting the
time series for discontinuities or by the date of a specific event. The
2https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
3https://github.com/openssl/openssl
4https://github.com/dspinellis/cqmetrics
effect of the intervention is estimated as a discontinuity between
the intervention groups before and after the cutoff date. When us-
ing a linear regression model, the intervention effect can include
both a change in level and a change in slope at the cutoff.
Regression discontinuity can be performed with a global or local
regression approach. In global regression approaches, the entire
data set is used to fit the model. In local regression models, the
model is fitted using a subset of the time series, with some data on
each side on the cutoff. This amount is called the bandwidth. RDD
works better with an equal amount of data before and after the
cutoff.While the global approach offers greater precision, it includes
data far from the cutoff, which may be influenced by trends other
than the intervention being studied. Given the extensive history of
OpenSSL before Heartbleed, we choose a local regression approach.
We use the following regression discontinuity model equation
to estimate changes in level and trend in code metrics after the
beginning of major post-Heartbleed work:
yi = α + τD + β1(ti − c) + β2D(ti − c) + ϵi
where D is a function that represents the discontinuity
D =
{
0 ti < c
1 ti ≥ c
In the equation above, c is the cutoff date, when code metrics
showed substantial changes. The coefficientα represents the level of
the regression line before the cutoff, while τ represents the change
in level after the cutoff. The sum α + τ is the level of the regression
line after the discontinuity.
The response variable yi is the value of a particular code metric
at time ti . The variable ti represents time in months. The coefficient
β1 is the slope of the regression line before the cutoff, while β2 is
the change in slope after the cutoff. The sum β1 + β2 is the slope of
the regression line after the cutoff. The variable ϵi represents the
error at time ti .
In our analysis of code metrics, we build RDD models with a
cutoff of February 2015. This cutoff was initially identified visually.
It is clear to see in the plots of nesting depth and style inconsistency
in Figure 2, which approach a step function that transitions from
one interval to the other in this month. While Heartbleed was the
initial impetus for changing OpenSSL, large changes to the code
base began in February 2015. Investigation of the project web site
and mailing lists reveal that the time between Heartbleed and our
cutoff date was spent building the team, developing policies, and
planning how to change the code base.
Confirming our choice of cutoff, the OpenSSL project blog pub-
lished an article about reformatting the entire code base to meet
the project’s new coding style guidelines in February 2015 [3].
Additional code cleanup was performed in the following months,
described in another blog entry published in July 2015 [35]. We
choose a bandwidth of 25 months on each side of the cutoff date,
so that we have a sufficient number of data points for our model
without including data points that are so far from the cutoff that
they are influenced by factors other than Heartbleed.
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7 RESULTS
7.1 Vulnerabilities
Our first research question focuses on security vulnerabilities. There
have been 177 vulnerabilities reported in OpenSSL through the
end of 2019. Figure 1 shows the trend of the annual number of
vulnerabilities. The date of Heartbleed is indicated by a dashed line.
While 66 (37.3%) vulnerabilities were reported in the approximately
sixteen years before Heartbleed, 110 (62.1%) vulnerabilities were
reported in the five years after Heartbleed.
We can see three eras of vulnerability reporting for the OpenSSL
project in Figure 1: the pre-Heartbleed era, the high vulnerability
reporting era from 2014 to 2016, and the modern era from 2017 to
the present. Vulnerability statistics for the three eras are detailed
in Table 2.
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Figure 1: OpenSSL Vulnerabilities Reported by Year
The pre-Heartbleed era has the lowest number of vulnerabilities
per year but with slightly higher severity scores (CVSSv2) than the
other two eras. There is a dramatic increase in the number of vulner-
abilities reported per year, from 4 to 30.33, in the high vulnerability
era, with severities remaining on par with the pre-Heartbleed era.
A majority (51.4%) of all vulnerabilities were reported in the three
year period between 2014 and 2016. Only five of the 91 vulnerabili-
ties found in the 2014-2016 time period were found in code written
after Heartbleed, so this era produced a substantial improvement
in the security of OpenSSL.
In the modern era starting in 2017, the number of vulnerabilities
reported per-year is almost twice as high as the annual count before
Heartbleed, but the mean severity of vulnerabilities has declined,
as has variability around that mean. However, the pre-Heartbleed
mean number of vulnerabilities per year is computed across many
more years than the mean for the modern era. If we restrict our
view to the four years before Heartbleed, the mean number of
vulnerabilities reported per-year is 7.0, which is quite close the
modern era mean of 7.33. The mean CVSSv2 score for the four
pre-Heartbleed years is 5.45 and the standard deviation is 0.84, so
we still observe a decline in vulnerability severity between the late
pre-Heartbleed era and the modern era.
Table 2: OpenSSL Vulnerabilities
Pre-Heartbleed 2014-2016 2017-2019
Vulnerability Count 64 91 22
Vulnerability Percent 36.2% 51.4% 12.4%
Vulnerabilities per Year 4.00 30.33 7.33
Average CVSS2 5.63 5.25 4.18
StdDev CVSS2 1.11 1.11 0.39
7.2 Code Size
In this and the following three sections, we analyze monthly time
series of the software metrics shown in Figure 2. We compute
monthly code metrics by checking out the version of the code
available from the first commit made during the month and running
cqmetrics on that version. Project activity metrics are computed
using all commits during the month.
To study RQ2, we analyze multiple code size metrics. Code size,
both in terms of the number of files and number of statements,
starts dropping shortly after Heartbleed, as can be seen in Figure 2a.
However, much larger changes begin during the code cleanup in
February 2015, which we chose as the cutoff date for our RDD
models. Table 3 shows a significant decrease of 12,260 statements
(10.8% of pre-cutoff size) after code cleanup began in February 2015.
We see a similar decrease in the number of files. Both models were
good fits as measured using the adjusted R2 metric, which is given
in parentheses after the model name in Table 3.
To better understand these size changes, we examined 126 com-
mits made in the 25 months after Heartbleed, in which the only
file changes were deletions. A total of 315 C source and header
files were deleted in those commits. We found multiple mentions
of obsolete or old files, including support for obsolete platforms,
old insecure protocols like SSLv2, and unmaintained demo code
in developer commit messages of these commits. These messages
point to the removal of files being an improvement of code qual-
ity, especially since support for old protocols exposed OpenSSL to
protocol downgrade attacks like DROWN [1].
In Figure 2a, we can see code size as measured in terms of the
number of files and statements decreasing from Heartbleed until
about the release of version 1.1.0 in August 2016. Version 1.1.0 was
the only major release of OpenSSL to have a smaller size at the time
of release than its predecessors. Code sizes measured by number of
statements for each version are provided in Table 1.
After February 2015, the number of functions had decreased sig-
nificantly by 737 (9.3%), but the number of functions being added
per month was almost eight times the pre-cutoff number. To under-
stand how the number of functions was increasing rapidly while the
numbers of statements and files were declining, we examine mean
function length. Function length transitions from an essentially
flat pre-Heartbleed trend to a decreasing trend (-0.072 lines/month)
after Heartbleed. This evidence suggests that the OpenSSL project
began to factor their code into smaller functions after Heartbleed.
Many programmers find that smaller functions are easier to under-
stand [22].
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(b) Code Complexity Metrics
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Figure 2: Regression Discontinuity Models
7.3 Code Complexity
Complex code is difficult to understand and maintain, so unnec-
essary complexity should be avoided. RQ3 focuses on changes to
OpenSSL’s code complexity. We examine three types of code com-
plexity metrics: nesting complexity, cyclomatic complexity, and
Halstead complexity. Nesting complexity is the number of levels of
nesting in source code.
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Table 3: Code Size Metrics Regression Discontinuity Models
Statements (0.88) Files (0.92) Functions (0.79) Mean Function Length (0.99)
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Pre-Intervention Level 113340.58*** 856.579 940.79*** 6.893 7876.18*** 50.579 14.389*** 0.034
Change in Level -12259.623*** 1166.553 -91.328*** 9.387 -737.394*** 68.882 -0.28*** 0.046
Pre-Intervention Slope 77.288 57.620 -1.293** 0.464 4.697 3.402 0.001 0.002
Change in Slope -72.429 79.191 1.093 0.637 37.12*** 4.676 -0.072*** 0.003
RDD models for code size metrics, showing changes in each metric’s mean and slope at February 2015. Each model’s R2
metric is shown in parentheses after metric name. Statistical significance is indicated by *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Table 4: Code Complexity Metrics Regression Discontinuity Models
Max Nesting (1.00) Mean Nesting (1.00) Cyclomatic (0.85) Halstead (0.87)
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Pre-Intervention Level 13*** 0 1.294*** 0.002 8.486*** 0.096 904.286*** 10.425
Change in Level -6*** 0 -0.508*** 0.002 -0.62*** 0.131 -60.071*** 14.197
Pre-Intervention Slope 0* 0 0*** 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.717 0.701
Change in Slope 0 0 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.044*** 0.009 -6.032*** 0.964
RDD models for complexity metrics, showing changes in each metric’s mean and slope at February 2015. Each model’s R2
metric is shown in parentheses after metric name. Statistical significance is indicated by *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
We study mean and maximum values of nesting complexity
and mean values of cyclomatic and Halstead complexity. Mean
complexity metrics are computed as a mean of the per-file mean
values of these metrics for each month in the dataset. We construct
four RDD models, which are summarized in Table 4. Figure 2b
shows both data and model fit for these four metrics.
The maximum depth of nesting in OpenSSL source files dropped
suddenly from 13 to 7 in February 2015. This change affected 94
files, when the OpenSSL project reformatted its code base [3]. The
RDD model of mean nesting depth shows a drop of approximately
half a level from 1.29 to 0.79 in February 2015.
Mean cyclomatic complexity dropped by 7.3% after February
2015. The trend of cyclomatic complexity evolution changes from a
small increasing slope before intervention to a larger decreasing
slope after the cutoff. The evolution of Halstead complexity follows
the same pattern, with a drop of 6.6% and a similar change in slope.
These changes suggest that the post-Heartbleed code cleanup was
effective at reducing the complexity of OpenSSL code and thus
improving readability and maintainability.
7.4 Coding Style
RQ4 focuses on coding style. Poor coding style can make code
difficult to understand and maintain, increasing the likelihood of
programmer errors and decreasing the likelihood of attracting con-
tributors to the project. Prior to the Heartbleed vulnerability, the
OpenSSL project had no coding style guide, and different sections
of code used a range of different styles [3]. In January 2015, the
project published a coding style guide [42]. In early February 2015,
project members reformatted the source code of the versions sup-
ported at the time (0.9.8 through 1.0.2) to ensure style consistency
throughout the project.
The cqmetrics tool computes a coding style inconsistency metric
based onn = 19 style rules selected from sources such as the Google,
FreeBSD, and GNU coding style documents [41]. For each way to
format a particular C construct, such as placing a space after the
while keyword, cqmetrics computes the sum of how many times
the formatting rule is followed, ai , and the sum of how many times
the rule is not followed, bi . The style inconsistency is the ratio
of the smaller of two sums with the total times the rule could be
applied in either way.
SI =
∑n
i=1min(ai ,bi )∑n
i=1 ai + bi
This style inconsistency metric shows a dramatic drop immedi-
ately after the reformatting, from 57.045 to 4.088, as can be seen in
Figure 2c. The slope prior to reformatting was slightly downwards,
starting in mid-2014 after Heartbleed, while the slope after refor-
matting is slowly upwards, showing a gradual increase in deviations
from the coding style as new contributions are made.
As part of coding style, we examine the use of both goto and the
C preprocessor. The density of goto statements does not change
substantially after the code reformatting and cleanup in 2015. How-
ever, the density of preprocessor statements decreases by about 10%
from 0.168 to 0.152 at the same point, with potentially problematic
conditional preprocessor statements decreasing 23% from 0.014 to
0.011.
The substantial improvements in coding style consistency and
reduction in C preprocessor use described above suggest that the
OpenSSL project focused on improving the readability and main-
tainability of their code after Heartbleed.
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Table 5: Code Style and Language Feature Regression Discontinuity Models
Style Inconsistency (1.00) Goto Density (0.86) Preprocessor (0.98) Conditional (0.98)
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Pre-Intervention Level 57.045*** 0.276 0.07*** 0 0.168*** 0.001 0.014*** 0
Change in Level -52.957*** 0.377 0.002*** 0 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0
Pre-Intervention Slope -0.09*** 0.019 0 0 0*** 0.000 0 0
Change in Slope 0.103*** 0.026 0 0 0*** 0.000 0 0
RDD models show changes in style and language feature metric means and slopes at February 2015. Each model’s R2 metric
is shown in parentheses after metric name. Statistical significance is indicated by *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
7.5 Project Activity
RQ5 addresses project activity. The OpenSSL project has become
much more active since the discovery of Heartbleed. Contributors
made 13,238 git commits (52.7%) in the 68 months after Heartbleed.
Only 11,905 commits (47.3%) were made in the 197 months before
Heartbleed. The difference in the number of commit authors is even
larger, with only 51 commit authors (8.8%) before Heartbleed and
554 authors (96.0%) after Heartbleed. Note that the percentages
do not sum to 100%, as a small subset of authors were active both
before and after Heartbleed.
The tenfold growth in the number of unique authors does not
equate to a tenfold growth in the number of commits after Heart-
bleed. This can be explained in part by the substantial number of
authors who contributed only a single commit. Only ten (19.6%)
of the 51 pre-Heartbleed authors contributed just one commit. Af-
ter Heartbleed, 331 (59.7%) of the 554 authors contributed only a
single commit. The large growth in both total and single commit
authors suggests that the OpenSSL project has become much more
attractive to outside contributors after Heartbleed.
In addition to looking at total numbers of commits and authors,
we perform a time series analysis of the number of commits and the
number of authors per month. We compute the number of authors
per month by counting the number of unique authors who appear
in git commit author fields during a month. Authors are identified
by name, not by e-mail address. We fit RDD models to both time
series.
Project activity begins changing immediately after Heartbleed, so
we use the month of Heartbleed (April 2014) as the cutoff date. Due
to the high variance in both of these metrics after Heartbleed, we
use a bandwidth of 50 months on each side of the Heartbleed month
rather than 25 months used above. This high variance is reflected
in the lower adjusted R2 values for these models compared to most
of our previous models, as shown in Table 6. Figure 2d shows the
model fit and data points. While project activity occurs in spurts,
there are clear and substantial changes in activity after Heartbleed.
The change in number of commits per month (122.44) is much
larger than the number of monthly commits before Heartbleed
(46.22). Similarly, the change in number of unique authors per
month (13.65) is much larger than the number of monthly authors
before Heartbleed (7.06).
7.6 Software Engineering Practices
RQ6 focuses on OpenSSL’s software engineering practices. In June
2014, shortly after Heartbleed, the OpenSSL project published a
project roadmap [43], identifying current issues, objectives, and
forthcoming features. Project issues included a backlog of bug re-
ports, some of which had been open for years, incomplete and in-
correct documentation, code complexity, inconsistent coding style,
a lack of code review, and the absence of a release strategy and a
security policy. The developer we interviewed indicated that the
OpenSSL team did not use code metrics to direct their software
engineering efforts.
The CII began funding OpenSSL in 2014, enabling the developer
team to grow rapidly. By December 2014, team size had increased
from two main developers to fifteen project members and four
full time funded developers [13]. The project began formalizing
decision making and published a vulnerability handling policy.
Project development moved to GitHub. According to the developer
we interviewed, the motivation for using GitHub was to increase
transparency and attract more developers.
OpenSSL published its first release strategy in December 2014, es-
tablishing end of life dates and planning for future versions. Version
1.0.2 was created as a long term support release with a backwards
compatible API, while version 1.1.0 was planned to improve design
and code while breaking compatibility with earlier versions.
The project published bylaws in February 2017, describing project
roles, including the OpenSSL Management Committee (OMC) and
Committers [44]. Starting in July 2014, the OpenSSL project re-
quired that code submissions be reviewed and approved by a core
team member. The updated 2017 committer policy required that
all code submissions to be reviewed and approved by at least two
committers, one of whom must be an OMC member [45].
The CII’s Best Practices Badge project provides a guide to good
open source development practices. The badge project was estab-
lished soon after Heartbleed to provide a method for open source
developers to certify that their projects follow best practices. Attain-
ment of a badge requires meeting 66 criteria in six categories: basics,
change control, reporting, quality, security, and analysis [49].
Prior to the changes made in response to Heartbleed, OpenSSL
had completed 62% of badge requirements. The OpenSSL project
attained its CII badge in February 2016, by enabling TLS for its
web site, protecting downloads of OpenSSL with TLS, publishing
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Table 6: Project Activity Regression Discontinuity Models
Commits per Month (0.51) Unique Authors per Month (0.80)
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Pre-Intervention Level 46.22* 21.801 7.057*** 1.416
Change in Level 122.438*** 31.461 13.653*** 2.043
Pre-Intervention Slope -0.23 0.751 0.108* 0.049
Change in Slope 1.904 1.079 0.039 0.070
Models show changes in metric means and slopes at April 2014. Each model’s R2 is shown in
parentheses after metric name. Significance indicated by *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
processes for reporting vulnerabilities and contributing code, us-
ing static and dynamic analysis before public releases, and using
continuous integration.
The OpenSSL project began using Travis for continuous inte-
gration in August 2015. In additional to building the software and
performing unit tests, OpenSSL’s Travis configuration reports test
coverage to coveralls.io and runs the flake8 static analysis tool
on the library’s python scripts. Continuous integration has been
shown to change other software development practices, such as
code contribution processes, issue handling, and testing [53]. After
adopting continuous integration, OpenSSL changed in all of those
areas, adopting a new code contribution policy, migrating issue
tracking from Request Tracker to GitHub [36], and increasing unit
testing.
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Figure 3: OpenSSL Unit Tests by Version
OpenSSL testing practices changed considerably after Heart-
bleed. The project adopted a new framework to make it easier to
write unit tests. The number of unit tests increased from 42 in ver-
sion 1.0.1 (the most recent version as of Heartbleed) to 152 in 1.1.1
(the current version). Figure 3 displays the growth in unit tests by
major version, including the trend for the number of tests at the
time of initial release and the number of tests for the most recent
release. It is important to note that the time between initial and final
release of a version is much larger for older versions. Version 0.9.8
adds three tests from first to final release, which happened over
the course of ten years and 35 minor releases. Version 1.1.1 also
adds three tests, but over a much shorter time period: three minor
releases and a single year. Modern versions (1.1.0 and 1.1.1) added
approximately one test per minor release, while older versions
rarely added tests for minor releases.
The OpenSSL project began measuring test coverage in 2016.
Test coverage grew from 54.6% in 2016 to 64.2% in 2019 as measured
by coveralls.io. There is no coverage data prior to 2016, but the
increase in the number of unit tests from the last pre-Heartbleed
version (1.0.1), which had 47 unit tests, to the version released in
2016 (1.1.0), which had 85 unit tests on initial release, suggests
that code coverage was lower before test coverage statistics were
collected.
OpenSSL has incorporated fuzz testing in its unit tests, and
Google’s OSS Fuzz project 5 also tests OpenSSL. While only sixteen
OpenSSL vulnerabilities identify the technique or tool used to find
the vulnerability, all sixteen vulnerabilities identify fuzz testing as
the technique. Nine of the sixteen identify OSS Fuzz as the tool
used, while five identify libFuzzer and two identify TLS-Attacker.
The OpenSSL project’s code is regularly scanned by a security-
oriented static analysis tool as part of the Coverity Scan project 6.
When OpenSSL was initially scanned in 2006, commit messages
reported fixing several bugs reported by Coverity. Coverity re-
lated commit messages continue through January 2, 2009. The next
mention of Coverity in a commit message occurs on May 5, 2014, a
month after Heartbleed. Similar commit messages continue through
the end of 2019, so static analysis has continued to be used since
2014. Our interviewee indicated that Coverity scan results are pri-
marily used when preparing a new release of OpenSSL.
7.7 Sustainability of Changes
Our final research question, RQ7, focuses on the durability of the
changes made in response to Heartbleed. Improvements in the
OpenSSL project during the immediate post-Heartbleed era can
be seen in the project’s attainment of a CII Best Practices badge.
5https://google.github.io/oss-fuzz/
6https://scan.coverity.com/
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The badge score improved from 62% to 105%. While the project
has not updated its badge application since 2016, we were able to
use the application to manually verify that OpenSSL has continued
to follow the best practices identified in its application, including
continuous integration, static analysis, and fuzz testing.
When we examine the evolution of code metrics, we find that
most improvements have been sustained. Code complexity, as mea-
sured by nesting depth, cyclomatic complexity, and Halstead com-
plexity, has continued to decline since 2016. The maximum nesting
depth remains at the level it dropped to after the code cleanup. Style
inconsistency has begun to grow at a slow rate, but the December
2019 value of 7.09 is still far below the April 2014 value of 58.9.
Growth of the code base resumed in 2016, as features like TLS 1.3
were added, showing that code shrinkage inspired by Heartbleed
was a temporary change in software evolution. Figure 4 shows
the post-Heartbleed evolution of a sample of metrics, including
code size in statements, mean nesting complexity, mean cyclomatic
complexity, and style inconsistency.
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Figure 4: Four Code Metrics after Heartbleed
The security audit commissioned by the CII was performed on
version 1.1.0 of OpenSSL in 2016 by the Open Crypto Audit Project
(OCAP) [51]. The audit included both code review and fuzz testing.
The audit reported several potential bugs in OpenSSL, including
two possible code execution vulnerabilities and two possible denial
of service (DoS) vulnerabilities. Other issues were reported by the
audit team as low severity or difficult to exploit. Only one OpenSSL
vulnerability report identifies the OCAP audit team as the reporter.
The Open Source Technology Improvement Fund (OSTIF) per-
formed an audit of OpenSSL 1.1.1, with a focus on the new TLS
1.3 protocol and changes made to the Pseudo Random Number
Generator (PRNG) [32]. Their report was published in 2019. The
OSTIF audit combined manual code review with fuzz testing. OSTIF
found two DoS vulnerabilities prior to the release date, enabling
the OpenSSL team to fix them before release. The report identified
some areas where code quality could be improved by checking
return values and implementing global checks for NULL values.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Construct Validity:We use multiple widely used metrics for measur-
ing code size and complexity to avoid bias in measuring those code
characteristics. The style inconsistency metric we use has been
used in other studies too [41].
Internal Validity: One of the most important validity threats to
RDD time series analysis is the presence of an event near the cutoff
date that influences the observed changes. We mitigated this threat
by thoroughly examining OpenSSL blog entries, commit messages,
and email archives in the months before and after our cutoff dates
for such events. Another threat to internal validity is that only one
OpenSSL developer consented to be interviewed, which may bias
our qualitative data.
External Validity: As this work is a case study of a single project,
we cannot generalize our conclusions to other open source projects.
We therefore leave the question of how open source projects can
successfully react to security events to future work.
9 CONCLUSIONS
TheHeartbleed vulnerability brought dramatic changes to OpenSSL,
transforming an almost moribund project to an active project with
substantial improvements in code quality and security. OpenSSL
remains the most commonly used TLS library on public web servers
five years after Heartbleed, according to IPv4 scan data collected
by censys.io. These improvements provide a model for how open
source projects can adapt and improve after a major security event.
We found substantial and sustained improvements in code qual-
ity. Code complexity declined sharply during themajor code cleanup
activity in 2015, and both cyclomatic and Halstead complexity have
continued to decline. The code cleanup made coding style much
more consistent. While style inconsistency has slowly increased
since the cleanup, it remains much lower than before Heartbleed.
The number of vulnerability reports dramatically increased for
three years after Heartbleed before returning to previous levels.
Only five of the 91 vulnerabilities found in those three years were in
post-Heartbleed code, so this represents a substantial improvement
in security. Positive results from two external code audits also
suggest that the security of OpenSSL has greatly improved. This
means that vulnerability count is not a useful indicator of project
security. Low vulnerability counts may just indicate that a project
is devoting little effort to finding vulnerabilities.
Our results suggest that project activity and practices may be
better predictors of project security. The CII badge may be a good
indicator of project security, since it requires good open source
development practices. To understand how generalizable these
recommendations are, we plan to compare the software evolution
of OpenSSL with that of related projects, such as BoringSSL and
GnuTLS. We also plan to examine the impact of the CII badge and
project activity on the development practices and security across
multiple open source projects to validate these ideas.
We have provided a replication package for this paper [48], which
includes the software metrics and project activity data used in this
paper. The package includes data collection scripts and the code
used to create the models and generate the figures and tables for this
paper. Documentation on how to use the scripts is also provided.
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